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Abstract  
Austerity was the driving principle behind the UK Coalition Government Comprehensive 
Spending Review in October 2010, with local government facing a disproportionately high 
share of the spending cuts. Research has focused on the impact of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 
2012; Watt and Minton, 2016) and urban regeneration (Dillon and Fanning, 2015; Pugalis, 
2016), however there is relatively little focus on sports-led regeneration. This article presents 
case study research of the stadium-led regeneration project involving Tottenham Hotspur FC 
and the London Borough of Haringey, focusing on the community perceptions of urban 
regeneration. It has two aims: first, to understand the local authority’s approach to 
regeneration in the context of the austerity agenda; and second, to understand how this 
approach was perceived by, and the impact on, those communities living within the 
geographical locality of the developments. Three themes emerged: first, that austerity led the 
local authority to adopt a pragmatic approach to regeneration; second, that regeneration in a 
period of austerity is perceived by local communities as a strategy of gentrification; and third, 
concerns over the lack of community consultation served as a stimulus for community 
engagement. Two implications arising from this research are that while community groups in 
Tottenham had limited success in gaining major changes to the stadium-led regeneration in 
Tottenham they have arguably been able to slow down the process.  Moreover, they have 
been successful in bringing together diverse groups across the community to share knowledge 
in order to challenge further proposals from Haringey Council.  
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Introduction  
The global financial crisis in 2008 resulted in governments implementing austerity policies 
aimed at reducing government spending and the budget deficit through a range of measures 
such as reducing labour costs and reforming the delivery of public services through increased 
marketisation (Meegan et al, 2014; Warner and Clifton, 2014). In the US, Peck (2014) argues 
that the impact of the neoliberal approach to austerity has been to redistribute the 
consequences of the financial crisis from the market to the state, and the costs and risks from 
federal government to state and municipal authorities. This ‘strategy of displacement’ (Peck, 
2014) has also been evident in the UK where there has been a shifting of the costs and risk 
from central government to local authorities, with austerity measures implemented by the 
coalition government after the general election in 2010 having had a significant impact on 
local government that faced a disproportionately high share of the funding cuts (Lowndes and 
Prachett, 2012).  
 
A number of authors have focused on the notion of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 2012; 2014; 
Watt and Minton, 2016), arguing that austerity measures have impacted disproportionately on 
the urban environment (Meegan et al, 2014). Related to this, some have considered that the 
economics of austerity (Dillon and Fanning, 2015; Pugalis, 2016) have been used as a 
“Trojan horse for an accelerating neo-liberal drive towards privatisation and marketization”, 
particularly in the context of urban regeneration (Glynn, 2006: 3, quoted in Pugalis, 2016: 
53). In the UK, this is evident through central government funding cuts to regeneration 
schemes, the replacement of Regional Development Agencies with Local Enterprise 
Partnerships that came out of the Localism Act in 2011 (Pugalis and McGuiness, 2013), and 
the inability of local government to borrow the required financial resources, thus opening up 
the space for enhanced private sector involvement in regeneration. It can be argued therefore 
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that urban regeneration during a period of austerity involves three interrelated elements: 
firstly, a central government change in policy that legitimated economic concerns above 
anything else (Pugalis, 2016); secondly, a greater reliance by local authorities on private 
developers to assist with regeneration; and thirdly, a resulting loss of local accountability 
with a retreat from efforts to engage communities in urban renewal (Dillon and Fanning, 
2015).   
 
This article draws on empirical research to illustrate how these three interrelated elements 
impact upon community perceptions of urban regeneration. Specifically, it presents the 
findings of a longitudinal qualitative case study of the Northumberland Development Project 
(NDP), a stadium-led urban regeneration project involving Tottenham Hotspur FC and the 
London Borough of Haringey. The article has two objectives. First, it seeks to understand the 
local authority’s approach to regeneration in an era where programmes are being downsized, 
funding is reduced, and institutions are being dismantled (Pugalis and McGuiness, 2013). 
Second, it looks specifically at how the approach taken by the local authority was perceived 
by, and the impact on, those communities living within the geographical locality of the 
developments. Existing literature on community involvement in regeneration suggests it is 
not easy to balance wider community or stakeholder participation with successful 
developments (Henderson et al, 2007) and regeneration agencies often limit participation to 
groups seen as legitimate, or most in tune with its objectives (Harvey and Schaefer, 2001). In 
light of some arguing that austerity urbanism offers the opportunity to stimulate participatory 
democracy within local communities (e.g. Havers, 2013), this article will consider the extent 
to which community stakeholders in Tottenham feel they have been involved and have had 
the opportunity to participate in the regeneration of the area. As such, it applies the 
stakeholder salience framework developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) as a way to understand 
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the approach local authorities take towards stakeholders such as private sector developers and 
local communities within the context of urban regeneration.  
 
The article begins by reviewing the literature on austerity and urban regeneration which 
serves to contextualise the research on stadium-led regeneration. It also sets out how 
stakeholder theory, and more specifically, the stakeholder salience framework (Mitchell et al, 
1997), are relevant to position research on austerity and urban regeneration. Details of the 
research methods follow this before the findings and discussion section set out the main 
results of the research through the analysis of the perceptions and interpretations of 
individuals involved in the stadium-led regeneration scheme taking place in Haringey against 
the backdrop of austerity budgets.  A discussion follows before the article concludes by 
summarising the central issues.         
 
Austerity and urban regeneration 
Donald et al (2014) emphasise that austerity is not a new phenomenon, having framed 
government policy during periods of financial crises; they also argue that the recent austerity 
measures are peculiar in that they have a local nature due to the decline in central grants to 
urban areas within the UK context. This aligns with the arguments made that austerity has 
impacted more greatly on the urban environment due to the fact that cities have faced 
uncertainty and challenges as they are disproportionally reliant on public services, employ 
greater numbers of people in the public sector, and contain greater numbers of marginalised 
groups that are impacted by welfare cuts (Meegan et al, 2014; Warner and Clifton, 2014). 
Thus, various commentators have proposed that cities are experiencing “austerity urbanism” 
(Watt and Minton, 2016, McKenzie, 2015, Peck, 2012: 628). For Peck (2012), in the context 
of the USA, this emergent phenomenon is underpinned by the fact that cities are more 
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exposed to austerity policies and as a result, are experiencing a fiscal crisis that has led to a 
restructuring of public services that will have long-term consequences, both positive and 
negative, for many. Similarly, Warner and Clifton (2014) have argued that US cities have the 
responsibility to provide social services but that austerity, alongside recession and high 
unemployment, has meant that many cities have faced financial crises with some such as San 
Bernardino in California having declared bankruptcy (Davidson and Ward, 2014).   
 
The focus on the local context is a result of governments pursuing a ‘strategy of 
displacement’ (Peck, 2014) underpinned by transferring the risk and costs from Federal 
(national) government to state and municipal (local government). In the UK, the equivalent 
process has been described as the “devolved axe” in which there is an “apparent devolution 
of power and responsibility to local actors, but in a context of wide-ranging expenditure cuts” 
(Deas and Doyle, 2013: 375). As Peck argues (2014: 18), this has resulted in a “strategic 
opportunity for new rounds of fiscal discipline, local-government downsizing and 
privatization”. This has been recognised by researchers looking at the UK context with Bailey 
et al (2015) stating that local government in the UK is in a period of crisis while Lowndes 
and Gardner (2016: 359) argue that local government is in the grip of “super austerity”. 
Indeed, while austerity was the driving principle behind the UK Coalition Government 
Comprehensive Spending Review in 2010, in practice, local government faced a 
disproportionately high share of the cuts. For example, the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) saw a 27 per cent cut in its local government budget and a 51 per 
cent cut in its communities budget over the four year period, (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).  
This compared with other departments, such as Education which saw a 3.4 per cent cut and 
Health, a 1.3 per cent rise over the same period (Government Comprehensive Spending 
Review, 2010).  In 2015, after five years of spending cuts, the new Conservative Government 
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announced a further 56 per cent reduction in central grant funding to local authorities over the 
period of the next parliament (HM Treasury, 2015; quoted in Lowndes and Gardner, 2016: 
358).   
 
Austerity may have been the defining principle of the Spending Review, but it proposed more 
than simply cutting budgets.  It also sought to foster innovation among local authorities and 
encourage entrepreneurial activity in order to promote economic development by reducing 
regulation, reforming the delivery of public services through outsourcing and entering into 
collaborative arrangements with other authorities, thus freeing up the ability to use their 
budgets in new ways (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 25; Donald et al, 2014). One of the ways 
in which these entrepreneurial opportunities may present themselves is through developing 
new ways to engage in urban regeneration schemes. This has been brought about by central 
government funding cuts to regeneration schemes with a reduction of approximately two 
thirds compared to previous spending after the election of the coalition government in 2010 
(Pugalis and McGuiness, 2013).  At the same time, the limited ability of local authorities to 
borrow money, the steep rise in London residential land values in particular, and a failure by 
central government to provide local authorities with the investment needed to maintain and 
renew their social housing stock (Watt, 2013) demonstrates the need, and potential, for local 
authorities to think more entrepreneurially in relation to urban regeneration.  
 
This new model for urban regeneration purports to involve an increased role for communities 
(through the Localism Act) and for private sector organisations: as Deas and Doyle state 
(2013: 377), “the contraction of direct state involvement means that urban regeneration may 
become exclusively or largely the province of private-sector funders and local citizens, 
assuming that market conditions are sufficiently buoyant to provoke some form of developer 
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interest and that local social relations are conducive to the mobilisation of residents”. 
However, what does this mean in practice? Does this lead to private sector developers having 
greater influence due to their ability to provide finances necessary to pursue regeneration 
strategies? Does the era of ‘austerity urbanism’ represent an opportunity for private sector 
developers, alongside those directly engaged in regeneration schemes, for example, builders, 
estate agents, lawyers, surveyors, and consultants (Watt and Minton 2016: 205), to more 
aggressively pursue urban regeneration schemes without explicitly focusing on the impact on 
existing communities? What if there is limited ability for communities to mobilise? If 
communities are able to mobilise, do their efforts result in any influence at all? 
 
It can be argued that in light of the focus by previous researchers on how local community 
interests are taken into account (or not) in the context of urban regeneration schemes, 
stakeholder theory is an appropriate lens within which to position this research. As advanced 
by Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory positions organisations as social institutions with 
responsibilities beyond their fiduciary duties to shareholders, directors and employees.  
Urban regeneration schemes can also add local communities to the list of interested 
constituents, thus aligning with the often quoted (broad) definition of a stakeholder as “… 
any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46). However, the ‘local community’ is to some extent an 
ambiguous term and can encapsulate a variety of different ‘types’ of community (e.g. Brown 
et al, 2006). As such stakeholder theory can bring particular focus to the impact that 
regeneration schemes have on different community constituents whilst also helping to 
understand whether community activists, advocacy groups and other non-governmental 
organisations (Eesley and Lennox, 2006) are able to influence a regeneration scheme. 
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Laplume et al (2008) identify a range of key issues addressed in stakeholder literature. 
Stakeholder identification is one of the issues of relevance to organisations (how do they 
identify and deal with relevant stakeholders) and also to stakeholders. In this particular theme 
within the stakeholder literature, the stakeholder salience framework developed by Mitchell 
et al (1997) is extremely relevant to understanding how different stakeholders are prioritised 
and given prominence by organisations based on the relational attributes of power, urgency 
and legitimacy, or overall salience. Salience was defined by Mitchell et al., (1997: 854) as 
“the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholders’ claims.”  The 
presence of one, two or all of these relational attributes provides a way for organisations and 
managers to categorise different stakeholders and to identify and manage those groups to 
which their claims are the most salient. The authors (1997: 881) recognised that their 
typology considered that each attribute was either present or absent, “…when it is clear that 
each operates on a continuum or series of continua.”  Also that it could be dynamic, rather 
than a steady-state. Stakeholder types were categorised.  Definitive stakeholders have all 
three relational attributes.  Ultimately it is the cumulative number of the three attributes of 
power, legitimacy and urgency that contribute to a stakeholder group’s claim being salient 
from the perception of management. Expectant stakeholders have two attributes, while latent 
stakeholders have only one of the defined attributes.  Non-stakeholders or potential 
stakeholders possess none of the attributes.  The authors predicted that the salience of a 
particular stakeholder to the firm’s management is low if only one attribute is present, 
moderate if two attributes are present and high if all three attributes are present. 
 
According to this model, entities with no power, legitimacy, or urgency in relation to the firm 
are not stakeholders and will be perceived as having no salience by the firm’s managers.  
This has major implications for such stakeholders that seek to influence an organisation, 
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although it is a subjective evaluation by managers of these qualities and is therefore open to 
change over time.  Stakeholders that are not perceived to possess any of the three attributes 
can rapidly become influential and this has been recognised by other researchers (e.g. 
Friedman and Mason, 2004).  It means that although managers may pay most attention to 
definitive stakeholders, they cannot ignore other groups without risking future difficulties 
(Senaux, 2008). 
 
It is important to understand how this framework has relevance when considering urban 
regeneration. Previous research has argued that the  physical transformation of derelict areas 
must be balanced against the failure, at least initially, to engage adequately with community 
groups and a belief that positive effects will “trickle down” (Bianchini et al., 1990; 
Henderson et al., 2007). More recently, Deas and Doyle (2013) have argued that the 
emphasis of regeneration schemes tends to be on economic growth and that local community 
involvement in such schemes is very limited. Thus, one can see how local community 
stakeholders are often marginalised or ignored by local authorities and developers that have 
the responsibility for urban regeneration. This can be explained by the Mitchell et al (1997) 
framework in that they could be seen as latent stakeholders where only one attribute 
(legitimacy) is perhaps present.  
 
In the context of austerity urbanism, the changes to central government policy prioritising 
economic concerns and the increased reliance by local authorities on private developers to 
assist with regeneration means that they can be categorised as definitive stakeholders in that 
they possess all three relational attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. As such, local 
authorities may feel that they have a “clear and immediate mandate to attend to and give 
priority to that stakeholders claim” (Mitchell et al, 1997: 878). This raises further concerns 
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surrounding the ability for local people to be able to influence the developments in their 
communities (Minton, 2012). This has been shown in previous research by Harvey (2008) 
who identified the opportunistic behaviour and exercise of direct power by large private 
organisations involved in regeneration developments in the USA. He focused on the role of 
universities including Yale, Johns Hopkins and Columbia, who are involved in the re-design 
of the ‘urban fabric’ of New Haven, East Baltimore and New York respectively, to suit their 
own needs. The concerns of local communities led to resistance to the developments (Harvey, 
2008).  
 
The prioritisation of private sector organisations and the marginalisation of community 
stakeholders have also been seen in the context of sports-led regeneration. For example, on 
the 18
th
 July 2013 the city of Detroit became the biggest US municipality to declare 
bankruptcy after years of decline.  The city had more than $18 billion in long-term debt.  At 
the time, half of the city’s street lights didn’t work and nearly a quarter of the city’s high 
school students dropped out before graduation, while the state dropout rate was one in ten 
(Guardian, 29 March, 2014).  Yet six days after the filing, the state’s economic development 
corporation gave approval to sell $450 million in tax exempt bonds to help finance a new 
stadium for the city’s ice hockey team, the Red Wings.  Almost 60 per cent of the funds to 
pay for the arena came from the tax payer (Bloomberg, 3 September, 2013).  In February 
2014, the city then approved a deal that gave Mike Illitch, the Red Wings’ billionaire owner, 
39 vacant lots in the area near to the new arena, valued at $3 million, for $1.  It was said to be 
a “transformational project” by Mark Morante of the Michigan Economic Development 
Corporation (Guardian, 29 March, 2014).     
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Developments in Sochi also serve to illustrate the universality of the issues such sport-led 
regeneration can provoke.  The top-down nature of the Sochi project meant that it was not 
without serious controversies, especially in regard to the extent of benefits to the local 
residents as opposed to real estate and big business, government or tourist outsiders.  The 
scale of the projects also made them less sensitive to public oversight, exposing the 
democratic deficit and corruption risks (Golubchikov, 2017: 15).  However, in Russia, as in 
many other countries, in the era of retrenched welfare state, there are not many alternative 
levers that governments can similarly use to legitimise large-scale interventions 
(Golubchikov, 2017: 16).  
 
In the context of the UK, there have been similar concerns with numerous studies having 
shown that the benefits of different forms of urban regeneration often fail to trickle down to 
local people who lack the skills and capital to benefit from emerging employment or business 
opportunities (e.g. Henderson et al., 2007).  Further criticisms have been directed towards the 
gentrification effects associated with regeneration (e.g. Bianchini, 1991; Henderson et al., 
2007; Watt, 2013).  These will inevitably impact negatively on stakeholders with limited 
salience. Whilst Brown (2008) argued that gentrification problems can be avoided with 
partnerships between the development and key stakeholders such as local government and 
community groups, the austerity measures advanced by the Comprehensive Spending Review 
in 2010 and the funding cuts to regeneration schemes have led to local authorities being more 
reliant on private sector developers in their regeneration efforts.  Development is seen as ‘the 
only game in town’ as it is a sphere in which local authorities continue to exercise some 
leverage to pursue their strategic regeneration aims (Dillon and Fanning, 2015).   
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This was the case with the 2014 Commonwealth Games, which was used as part of a 
regeneration effort in a deprived neighbourhood in the East End of Glasgow. Paton et al., 
(2016) argue that the developments reveal much about austerity and neoliberal capitalism.  
That gentrification and territorial stigmatisation work in tandem within urban regeneration 
policy interventions as a punitive strategy for managing poor populations.  This involves land 
value and (de) valuing of people and creates new localised class inequalities and insecurities, 
(Paton et al., 2016: 1).  The combination of neoliberal urban policy setting, stagnating 
economy, powerful vested interests, and a sporting event as a catalyst is precisely the kind of 
combination of issues that can produce the familiar mantra of “public pain, private gain” in 
large scale Urban Development Projects (Gray and Porter, 2015: 390).   
 
It was noted earlier however that the Localism Act promotes an increased role for those 
communities affected by developments to ensure that they are able to have some input into 
urban regeneration schemes. This requires first, that there is the necessary desire to follow the 
legislation; second, that there is the motivation for mobilisation; and third, that their voice 
will be listened to and taken into account. Whilst urban regeneration in a period of austerity 
points to the increasing power of local authorities and private sector developers, there have 
been examples where community stakeholders have been able to exercise considerable 
influence. Reid (2014) provides evidence of how a diverse range of astute campaigners 
formed an uneasy, but effective, alliance to prevent the ‘regeneration’ (i.e. closure) of the 
Meadowbank stadium and its surrounding land in Edinburgh.  In this rare defeat for the urban 
growth coalition groups, the Save Meadowbank Stadium campaign originated from local 
anger over Edinburgh council’s decision to close, with limited consultations, Meadowbank 
stadium, to fund new facilities deemed in the strategic interest of sport throughout the city. 
This body of literature serves to illustrate the point made by Mason and Slack (1996) that the 
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recognition of wider stakeholder interests must become an essential element of the business 
strategies of sporting organisations. However, to date there has been little research seeking to 
explicitly draw on stakeholder theory as a way to better understand urban, and sports-led, 
regeneration. This research involving the stadium-led regeneration scheme involving 
Tottenham Hotspur FC and the London Borough of Haringey illustrates how members of the 
community perceive the developments. It draws on the stakeholder salience framework 
(Mitchell et al, 1997) to better understand the approach that the London Borough of Haringey 
took towards the local community and how this was perceived by community stakeholders.  
 
Methodology  
Case study background 
This article emanates from a wider research project that sought to gain an in-depth 
understanding of how stakeholders seek to influence stadium led regeneration schemes. 
Purposive sampling allows cases to be chosen because they illustrate features and processes 
of interest (Silverman, 2010).  Pettigrew (1990) accepted that a mix of forethought, intention 
and chance opportunism can play their part in site selection, but also that access to a highly 
visible case and publication of significant results about an elite institution can have 
significant positive knock-on effects. One of the case studies involved the stadium 
development at Tottenham Hotspur Football Club. This development was part of the 
Northumberland Development Project (NDP), and spans the period of austerity urbanism 
with the original application in 2010 and eventual approval of revised plans by Haringey 
Council in December 2015.  Central to this regeneration scheme was the building of the new 
football stadium alongside associated developments that proposed a public square, new retail 
facilities, new homes on the site of the existing football ground, establishment of a university 
technical college and an increased role for the Tottenham Hotspur Foundation – a charity 
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connected to the football club (THFC website: new stadium plans).  The NDP together with 
High Road West were part of wider regeneration going on in Tottenham that followed on 
from the serious rioting that occurred in the area in the summer of 2011.  As part of the NDP 
and High Road West regeneration schemes, Haringey Council also proposed to build a 
walkway to connect the new stadium with a re-developed train station across the High Road, 
which would involve the demolition of privately owned homes and retail businesses, together 
with the Love Lane (social) housing estate and the Peacock Industrial Estate.  In September 
2011, Haringey Council granted planning permission to the football club for most of their 
proposed developments within the NDP, including the new stadium. In 2012, the Plan for 
Tottenham was developed by Haringey Council: a regeneration plan that set out in some 
detail the aspirations for the area. However, work did not start on the stadium development 
until early in 2016.  Superficially this was due to a long delay related to a compulsory 
purchase order over the privately owned business Archway Sheet Metal Works Ltd on the 
site of the proposed new stadium.  However, some sections of Haringey Council’s earlier 
viability report that were made public raised serious questions about the adequacy of the 
financing for the stadium at that stage (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 7 February 2012).  
Below, Figure 1 displays a timeline of the regeneration with key dates around the planning 
process. 
 
15 
 
Figure 1: London Borough of Haringey / Tottenham Hotspur FC: Northumberland Development Project Timeline 
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Data collection 
Data for this case study research were collected in three ways during a period of over three 
years between December 2012 to December 2015: by semi-structured interviews (14); 
participant observations of meetings and other events (28) (see table 1); in addition to 
secondary material. The interviews were one-to-one and each lasted between 40 and 90 
minutes.  All individuals that participated in the research did so on the basis of anonymity, 
although some spoke publicly and on the record through various media formats.  Using 
purposive sampling demands critical thought about the parameters of the population under 
study. From the outset of the research design, it was important to be able to work with a 
diverse group of stakeholders that represented different groups involved in the stadium-led 
regeneration. This was necessary to obtain the rich detail and for the validity of the study.  It 
can thus be seen that an interpretive approach was adopted for the research design, with 
access to reality (given or socially constructed) through social constructions such as 
language, shared meanings and instruments, all in context (Myers, 2013). Interpretive 
research examines how particular meanings become shared, dominant, and/or contested in 
situations in which alternative meanings and understandings are present, (Gephart, 2004: 
457).  Stakeholders, both individuals and groups, were chosen who could provide the most 
information about their involvement with the stadium-led regeneration at both sites.  The 
stakeholders included employees and representatives of the football clubs, local residents, 
owners of local businesses, councillors, police, community groups, and football club 
supporters.   
 
Following the guidelines for purposeful sampling in choosing respondents, (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985), a snowball technique was used, asking individuals for recommendations of 
others who could provide relevant information for the study.  It follows from the above that 
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not all of the individuals or organisations that were involved in this research were identified 
at the start of the process.  In this research, the goal was to understand the case site in as 
much depth as possible through a wide range of perspectives.  So it made sense to take 
advantage of new data collection opportunities as they arose in order to improve the research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
A short interview guide that contained the main research questions was drafted in order to 
ensure that the main issues and areas of interest were covered.  The interview questions 
related to involvement in the regeneration process, views about stadium-led regeneration, 
observations on other organisations or individuals involved in the process, perceptions of 
influence and likely outcomes.   The questions were open-ended and the respondents were 
encouraged to talk as much as they wanted, even when this strayed away from the starting 
point.  This approach allowed the interviewee to feel comfortable and more prepared to open 
up to provide greater disclosure around the issues.  It also allowed the discussions to cover 
wide areas, but provided consistency and focus by using the same original questions.  From 
the perspective of qualitative, interpretive research, the more interesting the story, the better it 
is, so long as it does not become fictional (Myers, 2013: 119). The challenge is to enter the 
social world of the research subjects and understand their world from their point of view.   
 
The interviews were recorded on a digital voice-recorder with the permission of the 
interviewees.  Transcripts of the interviews were produced by the author as soon as possible 
after the interviews (generally within 3 days) and sent to all of the interviewees to check the 
accuracy of their responses in word and in meaning.  This process proved helpful for fact-
checking and also to elicit further information.  Although no formal coding was carried out at 
this stage, the process of transcribing and discussing the interviews with informants in some 
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cases did informally start the process of data analysis.  It involved a process of thinking about 
the interview questions, about the informant’s responses and some of the themes that started 
to recur.  
 
Table 1: Data sources 
 
Interviews 
(14 interviews) 
Observations 
(28 full meetings) 
Local councillors, London borough of 
Haringey (4 separate interviews) 
Local business owners (4 separate 
interviews) 
Local resident and community activists (2 
separate interviews) 
Education consultant 
Parliamentary assistant 
Supporter of THFC and Journalist 
Executive of community sport trust 
Community group, Tottenham (18 meetings) 
Business group, Tottenham(2 meetings) 
Planning consultation, Tottenham 
Street assembly, Tottenham 
Street rally, outside Haringey Council 
meeting 
Meeting of Haringey Council full cabinet 
Community conference, Tottenham 
THFC ‘fun day’ 
THFC v CPFC community street assembly 
Haringey Council Planning sub-committee 
 
 
The participant observations in this research included meetings of Haringey Council; 
planning consultations in Tottenham; and public meetings of community groups, conferences 
and demonstrations (see table 1).  They also included private and quasi-private meetings 
involving Tottenham Hotspur FC and a range of community group meetings in Tottenham.  
Apart from public meetings, such as those of the local council, the participation was overt 
and all groups were informed of the author’s background and nature of the research. Direct 
observation provides access to group processes and can confront the researcher with 
discrepancies between what people have said in interview and casual conversations, and what 
they actually do.  For example, within community meetings there were sometimes 
discrepancies between the people that stated their intention to turn up at future events such as 
further meetings and those that did actually attend.  Such observations can also be used to 
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uncover the patterns of interaction that create more or less shared meanings (Bartunek and 
Seo, 2002).  
 
The interviews and participant observations were triangulated with secondary data from a 
number of different sources, which included planning documents, newspaper reports, 
webcasts of local authority meetings, company annual reports, corporate communications, 
community publications and material from various social media formats such as on-line 
forums and blogs.  The secondary data sources were used to categorise, investigate, interpret 
and identify limitations of the primary data.  They also allowed for a richer picture than could 
be obtained from interviews and participant observation alone (Myers, 2013).  Although time 
was spent evaluating secondary sources in terms of their reliability and bias, ultimately they 
were analysed and coded using the same methods as for the primary data sources and as set 
out below.   
 
Data analysis 
The research generated a large amount of data in different formats, including interview 
transcripts, reflexive notes from participant observations, photographs, audio files and 
secondary data in a variety of formats.  In order to assist in the movement from the “shapeless 
spaghetti” (Langley, 1999: 694) of data towards theoretical understanding, the NVivo 
software programme was used.  Throughout this process there was no intention to transform 
the qualitative research into an automated analysis of the text.  It assisted in making sense of 
the “captured complexities” of the real world (Pettigrew, 1990: 281).   The coding was an 
iterative process that started once the majority of the interviews and participant observations 
had been completed.  The analysis started by identifying relevant concepts in the data, using 
the language of the respondents, and grouping direct quotations under different categories.  
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Van Maanen (1979) calls these first order concepts the “facts” of an investigation.  In this 
research, this involved concepts linked to stakeholder’s views as expressed in interviews with 
the researcher and in meetings at which the researcher attended as a participant observer.  
During the coding process numerous other concepts relating to austerity began to emerge and 
demonstrated the importance of the wider political context underpinning the stadium-led 
regeneration scheme. This work was carried out by the first author with the assistance of the 
NVivo software programme.  To verify the trustworthiness of the data analysis (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985), two separate methods were employed.  Details of the coding and concepts were 
discussed with the second author in order to consider alternative explanations for the 
emerging findings.  Secondly, samples of the coding of the documents were reviewed by an 
outside researcher.  Any discrepancies were discussed in order to reach agreement on how to 
code the concept. For the purposes of this article, both authors began to look at the 
relationships between austerity and regeneration and how these related to the ability of 
stakeholders to influence stadium-led regeneration. From this analysis the authors identified 
three overarching themes: these themes are explored in more detail in the next section. It is 
acknowledged that whatever strategy is used, there will always be an un-codifiable step that 
relies on the insight and imagination of the researcher (Langley, 1999:707, acknowledging 
Weick, 1989).  
 
Limitations  
The fundamental purpose of this research was to understand community perceptions of the 
stadium-led regeneration in Tottenham and the majority of those that were interviewed, or in 
the meetings that were observed, were critical of the developments. Therefore it is 
acknowledged that there is a potential limitation in that those community voices that are 
reflected in this research tended to be more negative to the development. Whilst there were 
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some positive reflections, these were in the minority and as such, the critical stance taken by 
many members of the community receives more weight in this research. It is recognised 
however that stadium-led regeneration is likely to attract a range of different opinions and 
interpretations and therefore the conclusions drawn from this paper will likely relate to a 
particular set of individuals and will not generate unanimous approval; the results must be 
considered in this context. To counteract this, effort was made during data collection to 
reflect a wide range of stakeholder views. For example, it would have been helpful to 
interview representatives of Tottenham Hotspur FC, but the club was reluctant to speak on 
the record during the period in which the research was being carried out. This reflects the 
methodological challenges in undertaking case study research.   
 
Moreover, you could also question the extent to which the results are relevant more widely. 
Clearly within a complex local environment that included prolonged riots in 2011, it is 
difficult to generalise to other local councils, communities and sports organisations.  Again, 
this represents a methodological challenge in that it is always potentially problematic to argue 
for extensions from case studies. However, some sites may share commonalities with other 
domains, (Corley and Gioia, 2004: 205) and many of the features and processes of the 
stadium-led regeneration developments could be applicable to other locales as well (e.g. 
formal consultations, community reactions, forms of local governance, etc.). For these 
reasons, there is confidence that the research is likely to have applicability (not 
generalisability) beyond this particular study.   
 
Local authority pragmatism and private sector opportunism 
There was clear evidence that during the process of the planning application, decisions were 
taken by Haringey Council to ensure that the regeneration scheme was able to proceed. For 
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example, the original planning permission included a series of section 106 community 
infrastructure requirements amounting to £16,436,000, that set aside sums for highways, 
transport and parking improvements; education; heritage and community projects.  Planning 
obligations under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) are 
a mechanism which makes a development proposal acceptable in planning terms.  They are 
focused on mitigation of the impact of development and are often referred to as 'developer 
contributions'.  Common uses of planning obligations are to secure affordable housing, and to 
secure financial contributions to provide transport infrastructure.  Local authorities are 
required to ensure that the combined total impact of such requests does not threaten the 
viability of development sites, (Planning Practice Guidance, 26 March, 2015). 
 
The original planning permission additionally required that 50 per cent of the proposed two 
hundred housing units to be built on the site of the existing stadium were to be classified as 
affordable housing (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 7 February 2012).  Tottenham Hotspur FC 
provided a report to Haringey Council that expressed concern over the extent of the section 
106 obligations and that the requirements of the planning permission would mean that the 
stadium would not be financially viable.  This sought to put pressure on the local authority 
for which the regeneration was part of the long-term strategic re-development of the area. 
Although the move was ultimately unsuccessful, the football club further increased the 
pressure by making a bid to move to the Olympic Stadium in Stratford outside of the 
borough.    
 
This situation evidenced the salience of Tottenham Hotspur FC in this context, demonstrating 
that they could be seen as a definitive stakeholder (Mitchell et al, 1997) possessing power, 
legitimacy and urgency, and illustrates well some of the difficulties that local councils’ face 
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when dealing with a professional sports team. This is an issue long recognised in the USA 
where there is a propensity for professional sports teams to threaten to leave their city as 
leverage in negotiations for a new or improved stadium: “In a confrontation between a firm 
and a city, the city is like a boxer with his shoes nailed to the ground” (Euchner, 1993: 167, 
quoted by Schimmel in Gratton and Henry, 2001: 262). In the case of Tottenham Hotspur FC, 
the club was the largest landowner and employer in the area, which immediately put the local 
council at a disadvantage when negotiating over a planning application that is central to the 
council’s strategy for the redevelopment of the locality. The council accepted that “the new 
Stadium development faces a funding gap that has been exacerbated by the current 
challenging conditions in the financial and property markets” (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 7 
February 2012: 145), but that it was seen as a catalyst for attracting new investment into the 
area. The Reports Pack (Haringey, 13 February 2012) made clear that the decision was also 
made against the back-drop of the changed institutional planning context provided by the 
Coalition government in which the Minister for Decentralisation and Cities’ ‘Statement on 
Growth’ in March 2011 called for local authorities to review existing s106 agreements on 
schemes that were unviable.  The Draft National Planning Policy Framework (July 2011) 
provided further support by encouraging local planning authorities to avoid non-essential 
conditions or obligations that would undermine the viability of development proposals, 
(Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, 13 February, 2012, Reports Pack: 15). 
 
In response to these local and institutional pressures, in February 2012, the council granted 
revised planning permission.  This reduced the football club’s infrastructure commitments by 
almost £16 million to a total of £477,000. The fact that the football club had been successful 
on viability grounds in reducing an original 2011 Section 106 requirement for 50 per cent of 
200 units on the site of the old ground to be affordable housing to 585 units at full market 
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value by December 2015, provided evidence that Haringey Council were taking a pragmatic 
approach: by that it means that the threat of the football club leaving the area or not being 
able to pursue the stadium development due to financial concerns, together with a changed 
institutional context linked to an austerity budget from central government, resulted in the 
council making additional concessions to enable the scheme to go ahead.  In the context of 
the Mitchell et al. (1997) framework, this further evidenced Tottenham Hotspur FC as a 
definitive stakeholder; possessing power, legitimacy and urgency. 
 
This is reflected in the interviews with local residents when asked about the relationship 
between Tottenham Hotspur FC and Haringey Council. The feelings expressed revealed that 
there was the perception that the football club was “holding the council to ransom” and also 
that “the council are pandering towards Spurs”.  Even one of the local councillors expressed 
the concern that: “we know Tottenham Hotspur have got a track record of having the ear of 
the council”, (Councillor Bull, webcast of the meeting of the Overview and Security 
Committee of Haringey Council on 25 November 2013).  There was clear recognition of this 
in one of the interviews with a local councillor in which it was stated the need for some 
special arrangements for the football club: 
 
“Well then it depends, because the council obviously wants Tottenham Football Club 
to stay and maybe that’s why, from the section 106 point of view, various 
sweeteners…” 
 
This can be seen as the response to regeneration in an era of austerity. On the other side of the 
road, (literally), the Chairman of Tottenham Hotspur FC put forward a different perspective: 
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“The new stadium, visitor attractions, homes and other uses proposed for the site 
would support a total of 2,500 jobs in the locality – a net 1,700 directly employed at 
the site with a further 800 supported through the supply chain and other direct 
spending.  We are determined that this scheme delivers something that becomes an 
iconic landmark, instantly recognisable around the world and capable of acting as 
the catalyst needed to kick-start the regeneration of this area” (Daniel Levy, 
Chairman, THFC, The Hotspur, July 2015). 
 
There were other examples where Haringey Council was seen to be overly dependent upon 
private sector investment. For example, in a bid to further emphasise the opportunities that 
were available to investors and property developers, Haringey councillors attended the 
MIPIM property conference in Cannes in 2014, with property developers covering some of 
the costs (Haringey Independent, 12 March, 2014).  Concerns about the relationship between 
the council and big business were further raised when Haringey Council returned to MPIN in 
Cannes in 2015 and in 2016, where Tottenham Hotspur FC were one of six sponsors that paid 
£2,500 towards the costs of attending the event (Haringey Regeneration, 2016).   
 
This provides further evidence that the council’s approach to regeneration in an era of 
austerity was driven by the need to involve private property developers in providing solutions 
to some of the regeneration issues within the borough. Following the changes to planning 
regulations discussed above, private developers are seen as possessing increased levels of the 
relational attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency by the local council.  This could be 
argued to reflect an entrepreneurial approach towards regeneration that Lowndes and Prachett 
(2012) recognised local authorities having to engage in. However, this could also be seen as 
overstating the entrepreneurial nature of this approach: ultimately, it is simply the council 
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adopting a strategy of following the money in the face of austerity-led funding cuts. It 
therefore is more representative of a pragmatic approach (rather than an entrepreneurial 
approach) on the part of the local council. It also demonstrates that in an era of austerity, 
private sector organisations such as Tottenham Hotspur FC and development companies are 
able to take advantage of the financial difficulties faced by local authorities and work this to 
their own advantage. The need for local authorities to demonstrate greater innovation 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: Donald et al, 2014), especially those in urban areas, coupled 
with the lack of central government funding further opens up the space for powerful private 
sector organisations such as developers and in this case, a Premier League football team, to 
become  more embedded within local regeneration schemes.  However, both the local council 
and the football club were keen to clarify their own positions: 
 
“I think the kind of characterisation that somehow the council is dancing to Spurs’ 
tune is something I find quite curious”, (Clare Kober, Leader of Haringey Council 
from webcast of Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council, 25 
November 2013). 
 
“We are not taking public money.  That £41m is not coming in to the club.  It’s not a 
walkway to the stadium, it’s not our walkway”, (executive of THFC, participant 
observation at meeting, 4 July 2013). 
  
Regeneration or gentrification? 
The details contained within the Plan for Tottenham (the regeneration plan developed by 
Haringey Council in 2012) reveal there were aspirations to create thousands of new homes 
and jobs. It also included the demolition of property in the Tottenham High Road West area, 
27 
 
to be replaced with new flats, houses, shops, cafes, a library and a proposed cinema. Much of 
High Road West is adjacent to the new stadium now being built.  It has been argued that in 
comparison with previous local regeneration initiatives in Tottenham, after the 2011 riots 
there has been very little emphasis on community development in the urban policy initiatives 
proposed (Dillon and Fanning, 2015). Although launched with the usual caveats concerning 
consultation, both the new stadium and the wider development proposals soon became the 
focus of controversy, dissent and protest in the local community.  As one local resident and 
community activist noted in an interview:   
 
“But in the last year it has been clear that Tottenham has been earmarked by 
property developers and the council and indeed the GLA and the government for 
special attention in terms of mega-development and social engineering.  They’ve 
clearly got their eyes on council estates as a potential for what they call decanting - 
what other people could call destruction of well-established communities - and by 
hoping to grab some of that land and sell off some of the housing and generally they 
have stated that”. 
 
Many people in the local community felt disengaged with the council’s approach to the 
regeneration proposals due to a perceived lack of genuine consultation with decisions made 
during the process (discussed below). This reflected the perceived lack of salience of these 
individuals, arguably viewed as latent stakeholders, possessing only the relational attribute of 
legitimacy by the focal organisations These decisions included those related to: demolition of 
homes and businesses linked to the building of the new walkway; to reduce Tottenham 
Hotspur FC’s Section 106 community infrastructure payments and release it from a 50 per 
cent affordable housing requirement for property built on the existing football ground, and 
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overall lack of benefits for the existing community. Furthermore, in the final planning 
application that was finally approved by Haringey Council on 16 December 2015, planning 
approval was also granted for an increased 585 properties to be built on the site of the 
existing ground, all of which would be for sale at the full market rate (i.e. no affordable 
housing at all). This demonstrates the pressure under which local urban authorities are 
working to develop more housing, but without the means to fund such schemes and are 
therefore willing to accede to such demands.  It supports the wider re-emphasis on property-
led regeneration (Dillon and Fanning, 2015:189) rather than regeneration that is led by the 
needs of existing communities. Indeed, it was clear that many in the local community were 
unhappy with the progress of the regeneration in Tottenham and claims that were being 
made, especially where they were seen to be at the expense of the local community. Although 
social-engineering or social cleansing was not always mentioned explicitly, the issue was an 
undercurrent to much of the conversations around the regeneration developments, with local 
people lacking salience. For example, in an interview with a local resident and business 
owner it was stated that: 
 
“We are people that contribute greatly to the community, but we are being pushed out 
of the area we were born and raised in, Tottenham, and punished  for not fitting in 
with the new plans…….” “Spurs are holding the council to ransom and the council 
are pandering towards Spurs and saying this is going to be good for the community, 
but it’s not the community already existing here.  It’s a community they’ve got 
planned to bring in over 15, 25 years”. 
 
Similarly, these concerns were echoed by another local business owner: 
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“They said that these plans would benefit the community and the community wanted 
enhanced facilities and la, la la.  But I said we don’t and none of the shopkeepers do, 
because that walkway is not going to help anyone, it’s not.  It’s going to get rid of 
four generations of a family business that’s been there for thirty years…” 
 
Scherer and Sam (2006, quoted in Reid, 2014: 42) argue that urban growth coalitions, aided 
by narratives of community decline and regeneration solutions, “frame debates in favour of 
stadia constructions” and this can be to the sever detriment of the local community. As one 
local resident and business owner revealed in an interview that her family, business and home 
all felt under threat:  
 
“Well this thing has caused so much stress to us and as a business and as a family 
and as a couple.  Because like I say, you go to bed with a question mark over your 
head, you wake up with a question mark.  You’re faced with your life.  They’re on the 
block for the chop”. 
 
Some supporters of the football club were able to see the problems the regeneration strategy 
adopted by Haringey council caused for the local community and the impact of austerity: 
 
“It’s not hard to see why the walkway is so controversial. It flies in the face of all the 
fine words about community benefit the club was so anxious to utter in the aftermath 
of the riots and symbolises the growing unease at the divide between private benefit 
and public good that colours much current debate”.  
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The walkway would involve the demolition of a social housing estate and large numbers of 
retail businesses with private homes above in order to provide a more direct route for fans to 
walk between the railway station and the new stadium.  This latter quote also reflects the 
concern that previous critical research on regeneration has identified – that regeneration 
schemes are directed by a neoliberal drive for increasing the role and power of the private 
sector at the expense of both the local authority and local communities living within the area 
outlined for regeneration (Glynn, 2006; Pugalis, 2016). Whilst a variation on the following 
was heard on a number of occasions during this research, the quote from a local resident at a 
community meeting – “Spurs’ stadium is being used as a Trojan horse for gentrification” – 
summarised the views of many. It succinctly emphasises much of the distrust of the local 
community that grew out of a perceived lack of genuine consultation and transparency that 
has been noted in other regeneration projects (e.g. Jones, 2002). This lack of consultation is 
the third theme to which we now turn.  
 
Lack of consultation: the stimulus for community engagement  
One of the key issues identified during the interviews and observations that linked to the 
concerns around social engineering and gentrification was that many local people felt there 
had not been a legitimate consultation between the council, football club and the community. 
For example, in an email from a member of the Our Tottenham group (discussed below), 
there was a clear sense that council members were not forthcoming about the development:  
 
“We have been lied to and lied to by our own elected representatives.  The key 
decisions for this master plan were made long before the consultation. Key factors 
were decided at the beginning of 2012. That’s when our small businesses were 
sacrificed in order that one very big business could become even richer”. 
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Concerns were also expressed by supporters of the football club that although the fans and 
the local community should be at the centre of this discussion, “ …we are all too frequently 
told that options are simply not possible without further detail being given. This fuels a 
culture of suspicion” (Haringey Independent, 15th September 2014). It should be noted that 
Tottenham Hotspur FC’s stated position was that the club had no involvement with plans for 
the demolition of homes and businesses or the proposed walkway from White Hart Lane 
station. An executive of the football club made the point at a meeting between the club and 
Our Tottenham Group that it was “…useful to hear the concerns of residents, and that “…as 
a club, the way we operate is to take as much of the community along as possible”. Indeed, 
both Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC were more sanguine about the planned 
development together with the results of consultation and engagement efforts, as one local 
councillor stated in the Guardian newspaper in October 2014: “The project has the 
overwhelming support of the local community, 98% of which gave the proposals its whole-
hearted endorsement during last year’s consultation period”.  
 
Partly in response to Haringey Council’s Plan for Tottenham, but also due to the perceived 
lack of consultation and suspicion noted above, the Our Tottenham network was formed early 
in 2013 for local people to defend community assets and participate in the changes by putting 
forward their own community plans (Our Tottenham website).  It started up as a network of 
local community organisations and during the period of the research over 50 groups became 
affiliated.  Previous research has shown that through mobilising, networking and the 
formation of such groups that increased salience was built-up with the focal organisations 
(Harvey and Schaefer, 2001).  Members of the group reflected the considerable disquiet 
amongst sections of the local community about plans that were eventually approved by 
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Haringey Council for the new football stadium and wider regeneration proposals to which it 
was linked.  Our Tottenham focused on affordable housing and the protection of local 
services and amenities.  One resident specifically credited the council’s ‘rhetoric’ about 
consultations with encouraging the formation of groups such as Our Tottenham and much of 
the resulting dissent and protest. For example, it was felt that the council’s actions did not 
match its words by many within its community.  This was clearly evidenced when local 
traders presented a petition signed by over 4000 people against the proposed demolitions and 
the displacement of existing shops. Campaigners also used the media in its various forms 
whenever possible to make their case.  The traders argued that there had been little or no 
community consultation in arriving at the Plan for Tottenham.  … a disjuncture between 
property-led goals and the interests of existing communities was emphasised (Dillon and 
Fanning, 2015: 200). This was felt most strongly by those most affected; those who had 
homes and businesses that would be demolished under the regeneration proposals to build 
new developments and a walkway to connect White Hart Lane Station to the new ground.  
This resulted in local businesses starting the petition as part of their own consultation, as one 
local business owner revealed:   
 
 “The High Road West community was never consulted over the demolition of their 
local shops and businesses. The recent consultation never gave an option to retain 
them. Only the petition gave the community the chance to have its say”. 
 
The above demonstrates that there were strongly held views, especially from those that that 
lived or worked in the vicinity of the football ground, that they were not seen as legitimate 
contributors to the regeneration process to the extent that their participation was not to be 
encouraged. This resonates with previous research that has found that various stakeholder 
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groups have been excluded in the stadium-building process (Collins, 2008; Lee, 2002). 
People were keen to stress that the regeneration issues in Tottenham were not just marginal 
points picked up by one community group, with large numbers of individuals willing to sign 
a petition to save local homes, shops and other businesses.  
 
As a response to this perceived lack of voice, a range of strategies for trying to ensure that 
communities were able to have a voice were observed during the discussions at one 
community meeting in Tottenham:  
 
 “We don’t have one strategy; we have a whole range of strategies: lobbying, 
protesting, planning, support alternative planning ideas, we’ve got a positive charter, 
we’re supporting groups and networks”.  
 
These multiple strategic approaches to try to gain influence in the stadium-led regeneration of 
Tottenham by community groups was supported with shared knowledge from other groups in 
London.  These included ‘resistance by design’ (ASH), the forensic dissection of planning 
documents and data (35%) and the input of academics and students from a number of 
universities. Gaining media publicity had also been important in several campaigns, including 
in Tottenham, where members of Our Tottenham were prominent.   Examples included 
interviews carried by local media; letters published in the Evening Standard (28.03.13) and 
the Guardian (11.11.2013, 18.04.2014, 17.05.2015); an interview with Dave Morris of Our 
Tottenham carried by BBC Radio London (24.09.13) and an item for the BBC 1 London News 
evening bulletin (05.09.2013), which contained an interview with Lia Clera Gomes a local 
resident and business owner, who was also a member of a number of community groups.   
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Local groups also used social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter to update each other 
and put information into the community, which in turn could be updated rapidly.  Previous 
research has shown that activists have found social media to be a highly effective tool (Watt 
and Minton, 2016: 216).  As one local resident from Tottenham stated during a community 
meeting:    
 
 “It is through media and social media that we can keep the pressure on.  They 
[Haringey Council] accused me of low-grade media hackery – I take that as a 
compliment”. 
 
Discussion  
As Dillon and Fanning (2015: 204) point out, beneath the rhetoric of localism and the Big 
Society, one of the key elements of the austerity policy shift was the lack of any national 
urban renewal programmes in place providing dedicated regeneration funds to deprived 
communities.  Instead local authorities have been expected to look to the market for the 
resources they need for physical, economic and social renewal – thus providing opportunities 
for private developers. This case study research into the stadium-led regeneration in 
Tottenham corroborates this, revealing that firstly, within the context of central government 
funding cuts, Haringey Council have taken a pragmatic approach towards regeneration which 
has resulted in concessions towards the needs of Tottenham Hotspur FC - a private company 
- in order for planning applications to go through. This demonstrates how austerity-led 
regeneration opens up the space for an increased role for the private sector with the football 
club able to take considerable advantage of the opportunities that were offered by Haringey 
council. By drawing on the stakeholder salience framework developed by Mitchell et al 
(1997) and the relational attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, this research has been 
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able to provide a more theoretically informed understanding of how the position of the 
football club as a definitive stakeholder (Mitchell et al, 1997) of the local authority meant that 
it was able to ensure that revised planning permissions were granted that benefited the 
football club at the expense of certain local community stakeholders. In the Mitchell et al 
(1997) parlance, community stakeholders lacked salience. Pugalis and McGuiness (2013) 
questioned whether urban regeneration in the era of austerity represents a pragmatic strategy 
enacted by the local authority to withstand economic turbulence or whether it demonstrates a 
more covert strategy that seeks to continue the neoliberal agenda to reform and reduce the 
role of the state. This research would suggest that it is both; the adoption of a pragmatic 
approach is taken by the local authority primarily out of necessity but the decision exists in a 
broader political context in which austerity urbanism forms part of the ideological drive of 
central government to reduce state involvement and move us further towards a neoliberal 
economy. The Mitchell et al (1997) framework helps to better understand how this particular 
political context ensures that certain stakeholders are able to possess more power, legitimacy 
and urgency, and thus underpins why decisions around urban regeneration are made.  
 
The second, related point is that the pragmatic approach highlights one of the key tensions 
inherent in the policy of austerity urbanism and the aim to promote local economic 
development (Meegan et al, 2014). Local authorities have to cede some degree of control of 
the regeneration of their local area to private sector organisations and this raises concerns 
over whose interests are served by the regeneration schemes. Framing this again in the 
context of stakeholder theory helps to understand how local community groups with a lack of 
salience are therefore marginalised or simply ignored.  Invariably, private sector firms are 
driven by market logics and the needs of the consumer. This is problematic when it comes to 
regeneration. As Warner and Clifton (2014: 52) argue, by privileging market demand over 
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citizenship and community interests, it “fundamentally alters the avenues for citizens to 
interact with government. It weakens direct citizen claims on the state, and simultaneously 
establishes citizen channels via the market mechanism”. Despite the claim, mentioned earlier, 
made by an executive of the football club that they seek to “take as much of the community 
along as possible”, the rolling back of the initial section 106 agreements, many of which 
were put in place for community benefit, it is difficult to agree with this sentiment. Although 
there was considerable rhetoric about their commitment to the community, the key objective 
for the owners of Tottenham Hotspur is the development of a new stadium and community 
obligations that form part of the initial section 106 agreement are not fundamental to this. 
This was found in previous research on the development of the Emirates Stadium in Islington 
although in this case, the football club contributed substantially more to community and 
council services (Walters, 2011). The fact that Tottenham Hotspur was able to reduce their 
initial contribution is underpinned by the broader political and economic climate from which 
the austerity agenda has emerged. It also evidenced the greatly increased salience of private 
developers during this period.  Essentially, regeneration during austerity leads to the 
orientation of economic and social policy towards the needs of the private sector.  
 
This research therefore supports the findings in previous studies that have examined some of 
the urban injustices prevalent in state-backed regeneration strategies, making the case that 
‘new urban renewal’ often amounts to state-led gentrification (Lees, 2014). It has shown that 
stadium-led regeneration has extended a process begun under New Labour in which urban 
working-class neighbourhoods were deliberately targeted for gentrification by replacing 
apparently ‘obsolete’ terraced and estate housing (and its apparently ‘obsolete’ inhabitants) 
with new private housing developments attractive to middle-class households (Hodgkinson et 
al, 2012; Watt and Minton 2016). Indeed, local residents and business owners expressed their 
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views that as part of the wider regeneration linked to the new stadium in Tottenham, “social 
engineering”, “social cleansing” and “gentrification” were taking place around them;  phrases 
that were frequently used in community meetings.  Equally, council representatives were very 
keen for these phrases not to become part of the discourse linked with regeneration in 
Tottenham.  The London Olympic Park development has provoked similar controversy over 
the displacement of lower-income East Londoners (Watt, 2013). In the USA community 
resentment as a result of reduced social housing and dislocation, has been found to be an 
enduring feature in stadium-led regeneration projects (Rutheiser, 1996, quoted in Matheson, 
2010: 12).   
 
For Haringey Council, highly dependent on the private sector for the financing of the 
regeneration scheme within Tottenham, their approach to the regeneration of the area aligns 
towards this market citizenship perspective, underpinned by discussions of the economic 
benefits that the regeneration will bring. This leads to the third point: it fundamentally 
changes the ways that citizens in Tottenham are able to interact with local government in 
regard to the stadium-led regeneration scheme. Rather than being granted devolved powers, 
they are kept at arms-length, their ability to participate is reduced, and they become further 
disassociated from the development taking place in the urban environment in which they live.  
This undermines some stakeholders’ rights to the city.  This is the process of displacement 
and what Harvey (2008) called ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which he saw as laying at 
the core of urbanisation under capitalism. 
 
Whilst community groups push back against this development, research has shown that 
participation in regeneration schemes is limited to those groups seen as legitimate or most 
aligned with the objectives of those making the decisions (Harvey and Schaefer, 2001). In the 
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current era of austerity, this research has suggested that communities are even less able to 
influence a development due to what Donald et al (2014) term an ‘austerity machine’: this is 
where the political networks and local coalitions that give legitimacy to political projects are 
strengthened in favour of the interests of private capital. In these circumstances, urban 
regeneration schemes will often go ahead at the expense of the local community. Instead of 
experiencing devolved powers, the relative lack of voice and the power has a knock on effect 
of increasing stress, tensions and leading to potentially more desperate strategies to make 
their voices heard. One of the ways in which the pragmatic situation could be improved 
would be to allow for greater participation by all stakeholders through consultations that are 
perceived to be genuine by the local communities.  This could lead to positive effects for all 
stakeholders (Impact of Regeneration, 2007), with potential issues dealt with at an early stage 
and fewer triggers for community protests.  
 
To summarise, this study supports previous work (e.g. Butterfield et al, 2001) that 
stakeholders with institutional power, such as the local council, and economic power, such as 
the football club, are likely to be the most influential in the context of stadium-led 
regeneration. The Mitchell et al (1997) framework provides the ability to understand why this 
is the case through the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. Community stakeholders 
in the sports-led regeneration of Tottenham have been marginalised due to their perceived 
lack of salience by decision making bodies. The logical conclusion of this is that, in the 
interest of local democracy, there is a need across a wide range of regeneration projects for 
local authorities to take into account the needs of community stakeholders, broadly construed, 
due to their lack of salience. However, as noted in this research, the political and economic 
climate has ensured that local authorities are more reliant upon the private sector and thus the 
definitive nature of private sector developers ensures that balancing their needs with those of 
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the community has become even more skewed in favour of private sector developers. 
Notwithstanding the excellent work of Reid (2014), further research is needed as to how 
community groups respond to sport-led regeneration and how they can seek to implement 
strategies that allow them to gain or increase salience with local authorities, especially in 
times of austerity.  The framework of Mitchell et al. (1997) offers a useful lens through which 
to analyse these often complex issues.    
 
Conclusion 
The first objective of this article was to understand the approach of the London Borough of 
Haringey to the sports-led regeneration scheme involving Tottenham Hotspur FC in the 
context of austerity. The evidence presented supports the contention that austerity has 
resulted in the local authority having to adopt a pragmatic approach which has opened up the 
space for further entrenchment of the private sector within regeneration private sector. This 
can be seen, as previous research has argued, as part of central government’s broader 
neoliberal drive towards increased privatisation and marketization (Glynn, 2006) that will 
lead to the increased commodification of the public sphere and will alter the relationship 
between the voluntary and community sector, citizens, and the local authorities (Meegan et 
al, 2014). As Pugalis (2016: 69) writes, “Austere conditions provided a ‘legitimate’ alibi for a 
neoliberal assault on the remaining welfarist features of state modes of regeneration”. This 
paper has empirically demonstrated how this process has played out in the context of the 
Northumberland Development Project (NDP) that is taking place in Tottenham. The second 
objective was to understand how this approach was perceived by, and the impact on, those 
communities living within the geographical locality of the developments. The research 
revealed that austerity-led regeneration and the development of the football stadium was 
perceived by many in the local community as a Trojan horse for the gentrification of 
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Tottenham. This was reinforced by the perceived lack of community consultation, with this 
shown to have acted as a stimulus for community engagement.  
 
There are two key implications arising from this research. Despite the fact this research has 
shown that many members of the local community believed they had not been consulted or 
allowed to participate in the stadium-led regeneration of the area, and given that they had 
very limited success in gaining major changes to the stadium-led regeneration in Tottenham, 
it can be argued that they were able slow down the process. For example, there was a 
considerable delay in years of granting final planning permission for the new stadium, and 
associated regeneration developments on the other side of High Road have not even begun.   
Community groups and individuals were also able to publicise local issues related to the 
regeneration developments.  This in itself is important as it gives credence to the idea that 
despite how powerless community groups may feel in the face of regeneration projects that 
are driven predominantly by the needs of the private sector they can make some impacts on 
the regeneration process.   
 
The second point, related to this, is that the community opposition served to engage disparate 
groups of people and therefore one of the key successes is the bringing together diverse 
groups across the community to share knowledge. By doing so, they increased their salience 
with the focal organisations.  This might be an important instrumental weapon that could be 
used in future to challenge further proposals from Haringey Council. Thus, it is important to 
re-iterate the call from others for further research into the impacts of austerity of sports 
organisations (e.g. Parnell et al, 2017) and their local communities but specifically argue the 
need to focus on the issue of stakeholder mobilisation to better understand how community 
groups come together and seek to influence sport-led regeneration schemes. 
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